I was midway through my morning surgery and in walked Joanna, a woman in her late thirties. She told me her periods were irregular, and someone had suggested that she might need hormone replacement therapy. She asked for my opinion and advice. A systematic line of enquiry and discourse opened for me: menstrual history, family history, symptoms, Joanna's views on and understanding of hormone replacement therapy, a sharing of the evidence on prevention of osteoporosis and heart disease and the most recent evidence on the effect of hormone replacement therapy on her risk of breast cancer. The consultation seemed a perfect example of the way we can use evidencebased medicine to empower a patient to make an informed choice. Or was it? Something wasn't right. Perhaps it was her body language, or the look in her eyes, or a momentary hesitation: my intuition caused me to switch tack, ask open questions, say nothing. Only then did we together discover that what she really wanted to talk about was her desire for another child, her difficulty conceiving, her fearful memories of her last pregnancy. In the end, evidence was not what she wanted or needed.
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Thus, I hesitate in my professional enthusiasm for evidence-based medicine. One part of me is keen to offer patients information and treatment based on relevant and rigorous research. As a professional, that is what I should offer: problem solving based on the application of specialist scientific knowledge. I work hard to keep up-to-date and to avoid offering useless and perhaps dangerous treatments. But it is the other part of me, no less professional despite not fitting the classic definition, which questions the relevance of evidence-based medicine. This causes a dilemma. And how can I write about this dilemma when I cannot even define one side of it, other than by such words as intuition? Donald Schon, in his book The Reflective Practitioner, offers a framework to better understand this dilemma1. His thesis is that we are bound to a model of professional knowledge, called by him technical rationality. This leads to professional activity being defined as instrumental problemsolving, made rigorous by the application of scientific theory and technique. However, in our actual practice we are increasingly aware of the importance of the phenomena of 304 Warwick House Medical Centre, Upper Holway Road, Taunton TAl 2YJ, England complexity, uncertainty, instability, uniqueness, and valueconflict. These phenomena do not fit the model of technical rationality. Our medical education, which teaches us basic and applied science and then the skill of applying that knowledge to medical problems, does not help us. We are bound to a knowledge base that leaves us at a loss to explain, or even describe, these processes which are central to professional competence.
'From the perspective of Technical Rationality, professional practice is a process of problem solving. Problems of choice or decision are solved through the selection, from available means, of the one best suited to established ends. But with this emphasis on problem solving, we ignore problem setting, the process by which we define the decision to be made, the ends to be achieved, the means which mav be chosen. In real world practice, problems do not present themselvres to the practitioner as givens. They must be constructed from the materials of problematic situations which are puzzling, troubling and uncertain. In order to convert a problematic situation to a problem, a practitioner must do a certain kind of work. He must make sense of an unccrtain situation that initially makes no sense. Although problem setting is a necessary condition for technical problem solving, it is not itself a technical problem. Problem setting is a process in which, interactively, we name the things to which we wvill attend and frame the context in which we will attend to them'. From this viewpoint, evidence-based medicine may be the ideal to strive for in problem solving, but not applicable in the large part of our work which concerns problem setting.
British general practice has a rich tradition of publication and teaching in problem setting. Starting with Balint in the 1950s, through various works analysing and mapping out the consultation, to a more recent interest in sociological research on the patient's perspective, general practice has a base of skill and confidence in this area which is untaught and unknown to the majority of specialists.
Balint's psychotherapeutic approach to the doctorpatient relationship2 gives us insight into how we can use our own selves as therapy, by observing and reflecting back to the patient the unspoken part of the consultation. The 'flash' of mutual understanding that can arise in such a consultation may not be common, but it has a lasting impact on both parties. Another strand of work on the consultation produced models of the process which defined the particular tasks and skills required at different stages of the interaction. This then provided a basis for teaching of communication skills. This work started, in the 1 970s, with the then novel idea of audiotaping and analysing real consultations, and produced books such as Doctors Talking to Patients by Byrne and Long3, which gave doctors for the first time an insight into their consulting styles. This led on to a great surge of interest in the consultation process in the 1980s when authors such as Pendleton4 and Neighbour5 helped us to see the consultation as a series of stages, each with different aims. More importantly they described the communication skills needed to achieve the aims and offered suggestions as to how these skills could be learnt. Subsequently, researchers such as Bain6 and Gask7 showed that these skills could be self-taught, through video analysis, and then taught to trainees so that interviewing skills improved.
The third strand to this problem-setting agenda involves research on the patient's perspective. This helps us to view the ten-minute consultation as only one part of a wider lay perspective on health and disease and to understand people's need to make meaning and take control of their symptoms. Many different disciplines are involved here, especially psychology and medical sociology. The interview study reported in Tuckett's book A Meeting Between Experts8 teaches us how important it is to negotiate agreement between our expert view of their problem, as experts in medicine, and the patient's opinions, explanations and questions about their condition, as experts in their own body and situation. Research into patients' views on taking medicines, such as that by Stimpson9, has challenged viewss of prescribing and 'compliance' which have arisen from the technical rationality stable and helped us understand how important being in control of their situation is to the patient, and how the concept of compliance needs to be replaced by that of concordancel0. Our understanding of the patient's perspective, and its effect on health and illness, can be deepened by research from a wide range of disciplines, cspecially from anthropological and biographical sources. Kleinman1 , for example, describes how concepts from cultural anthropology can be developed into clinical strategies and taught to medical students so that their history taking elicits the patients' own beliefs about their illness and treatment and negotiates any discrepancies before they interfere with treatment and progress. Brodv takes the concept of biographical medicine a step further. In his book Stories of Sickness12 he illustrates how each human life can be seen as an individual narrative and how the effect of sickness for an individual depends on how it alters these stories and how meaning is given to the illness by both patient and doctor.
And what of the 1 990s? It would appear that the patientcentred approach to practice is now making progress not
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Method13 and research by Henbest and Stewart14 and others is demonstrating its worth. Perhaps the new marketplace and the pressures of fundholding and a primary-care-led National Health Service are taking up all our time. Perhaps also, and more fundamentally, our dilemma about practising evidence-based medicine has sapped our confidence. This is unnecessary. By understanding that a general practitioner's work is both problem setting and problem solving, we can see that evidence-based medicine can be a step forward in the problem-solving work which will complement, rather than challenge, our rich tradition in the problem-setting aspect of practice.
That being so, is evidence-based medicine a step forward for problem solving in general practice? First, it depends on what is meant by 'evidence'. To be relevant and useful in general practice the evidence on which we base our medicine must originate from research done on populations similar to our primary care populations, and treatments that are available, acceptable and affordable. Thus the results of the randomized controlled trials being conducted by the Medical Research Council, using the General Practice Framework to recruit and monitor general practice patients, are going to be more useful to us than trials in specialist hospital clinic populations. And treatment results for laparoscopic surgery by a specialized enthusiast may not be useful when the only local option is a surgeon whose main interest lies elsewhere. There is obviously a desperate need for dialogue between researchers, metaanalysts and general practitioners. Practitioners need training in applying trial evidence to their indiv-idual circumstances, and researchers need to understand that pragmatic trials have practical advantages over highly controlled oncs. Despite all these difficulties most general practitioners would agree that taking a step forward in much of our therapeutic practice would not be difficult. Until lately the scientific basis for therapeutic decisions was sketchy, and we have often recommended treatments simply because that is what a professor once told us, or that is what our partner uses, or that is what the drug representativ,e said. We have been quite unable to quote figures for percentages of patients likely to respond, numbers of complications, likelihood of spontaneous remission. Having such evidence available must facilitate patients' involvement in decision-making and enable us to balance our experiential knowledge with an epidemiological vTiew.
Ev-idence from randomized controlled trials can, therefore, improve our problem-solving abilities. What about other evidence? One of the major problems in applying research e-idence to the individual case is knowing how to here in Britain but across the Atlantic where McMaster 305 judge what response this particular individual is going to have. Evidence need not stop with randomized controlled trials. Evidence from descriptive and qualitative research can be just as useful and is an area where general practice researchers have much to offer. In helping my patient Joanna with her fears and conflicts regarding pregnancy, for example, qualitative research which describes and makes sense of women's experience of pregnancy and childbirth and the effect of these on future health15 provides the information that both Joanna and I can assess, learn from and use in problem solving. In this consultation, and many others, it is difficult to imagine how randomized controlled trials would provide relevant evidence. Those who include as 'evidence' only the results of the trials held in the Cochrane database need to radically expand their perspective. Donald Schon acknowledges that there are sections of any profession that eschew 'the high hard ground where practitioners can make effective use of research-based theory and technique' and instead 'choose the swampy lowlands. They deliberately involve themselves in messy but crucially important problems and, when asked to describe their methods of enquiry, they speak of experience, trial and error, intuition, and muddling through'.
All general practitioners will recognize the swampy lowlands. However, by understanding the separate tasks of problem setting and problem solving we can value and expand the huge range of writing and research that helps us through the swamp of problem setting, and also take on the new challenge of providing and using appropriate evidence in problem solving.
